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Abstract 
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between four measures of central bank 
independence and macroeconomic performance.  We look at both the mean and the variance 
of output and  inflation for  twenty industrial countries for  the  period  1972-1992.  The 
elasticity  of  inflation with  respect  to  central bank  independence is  estimated  and  we 
calculate the fraction of the covariance between the mean and the variance of inflation that 
can be explained by their common association with central bank independence. We check 
the robustness of our results by looking at four indices of central bank independence, two 
subperiods  and by including control variables.  We  find that  central bank independence 
lowers  the mean and variance of inflation but has no effect  on the mean and variance of 
output growth.  © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In  both  economic  research  and  policy  making,  the  issue  of  central  bank 
independence has been widely investigated and discussed during the last decade. 
To  a  large  extent,  this  interest  is  motivated  by  the  success  of  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank  in  keeping  the  rate  of inflation stable  at  a  low  level  for  several 
decades. Economic theory as developed by Rogoff (1985),  Neumann (1991)  and 
Lohmann (1992) suggests that countries having an independent central bank can 
achieve low inflation rates because politicians cannot so easily influence monetary 
policy. This is good because politicians face a  time-inconsistency problem when 
they try to implement their preferred policies and this leads to inferior outcomes. 
The time-inconsistency problem can be mitigated by delegating monetary policy to 
an independent central bank that is more conservative than the government in the 
sense that it cares more about inflation. However, the improved  credibility  that 
brings the lower rate of inflation comes at the cost of having less flexibility.  Since 
the conservative central bank cares more about a low and stable rate of inflation, it 
will care less about stabilizing output shocks. In this paper we want to confront 
these theoretical results  with the data for twenty industrial countries (Australia, 
Austria,  Belgium, Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer- 
land, the UK and the US) for the post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1992).  We 
also want to investigate how sensitive the empirical results are for the measure of 
central bank independence and the sample period that is chosen. Therefore, we do 
our regressions with four different measures for central bank independence and for 
both the whole sample period and two subperiods 1972-1982  and 1983-1992. 
There  are  four important conclusions that follow from our paper.  First,  our 
estimation results show an inverse relationship between central bank independence 
and  the  level  of  inflation  that  is  also  found  by  Alesina  (1988,  1989)  and 
Cukierman et al. (1992). Including openness as an additional explanatory variable 
as suggested by Romer (1993) doesn't change our results. Secondly, like Alesina 
and Summers (1993), we find some empirical evidence that the more independent 
the central bank is,  the lower the variance of inflation. Thirdly, we do not find 
empirical support for the implication of the Rogoff (1985) model that more central 
bank independence leads to a higher variance of real output growth. Finally, after 
controlling for other factors that influence economic growth as described by Barro 
(1991),  De Long and Summers (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992),  we find no 
empirical relationship between central bank independence and the  level of real 
output growth. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, building on the Rogoff (1985) 
model we  briefly analyze the theoretical relationships of central bank indepen- 
dence with the distributions of output and inflation. In Section 3 we confront the 
propositions from the game-theoretic model with empirical evidence. We perform 
a  sensitivity  analysis  that  consists  of  using  various  indices  of  central  bank S. Eifffinger et aL /  European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998)  73-88  75 
independence, looking at two  subperiods  and adding control  variables.  Finally, 
Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Credibility  vs.  flexibility 
2.1. Recapitulation of the monetary policy game 
This  section  offers  a  short  sketch  of  the  theoretical  background  for  the 
empirical work.  It links  the Rogoff model to  the empirical work on indices of 
central bank independence (henceforth CBI). 
There are two players, wage-setters and the central bank. Wage-setters unilater- 
ally choose the nominal wage every period, and the central bank controls monetary 
policy. The labour market is characterized by one-period nominal wage contracts 
(Gray, 1976;  Fischer,  1977).  Therefore, output rises with unanticipated inflation. 
The behaviour of wage-setters is captured by a standard Phillips curve and can be 
derived  from  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  and  a  competitive  labour 
market (Schaling, 1995). 
1 
Yt  --(7rt-Et_lzr,+v~)  0</3<1  (1) 
1-13 
where  y  is output, (1 -/3)-~  are the output gains of unanticipated inflation (the 
slope of the Phillips curve),  ~r  is  the rate  of inflation and  v,  z  is  an  aggregate 
supply shock with mean zero and finite variance trf. The natural level of expected 
output is normalized at zero. 
The social loss function W penalizes both inflation and deviations from output 
target k > O. 
1  2  X  2 
Wt =  -~ (Trt)  +-~(yt-k)  0<X <°°  (2) 
The parameter X is the relative weight of output stabilization relative to inflation 
stabilization in the preferences of society. It is well-known that the minimization 
of Eq.  (2)  subject to the Phillips curve (Eq.  (1))  results in a  counterproductive 
inflation bias (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983) with no gains 
in the form of systematic higher output. 
2.2. The legislative approach 
In this paper we consider the legislative approach to monetary stability, namely 
to create by law a very independent central bank with an unequivocal mandate to 
focus on price stability. Academic contributions in this area are Rogoff (1985) and 
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Rogoff proofs  that  society  (the  principal)  can  reduce  the  time-consistent 
inflation  rate,  at  the  expense of a  less  flexible response  to  output  shocks,  by 
delegating monetary policy to an agent who is known to place a greater weight on 
inflation stabilization than is embodied in the social loss function (Eq. (2)). 
This agent minimizes 
lnt-E  2  X  tt=T(,lrt)  +~-(y-k)  2  0<,<oo  (3) 
When  •  is strictly greater than zero,  then this agent is more 'conservative' than 
society. 
In the empirical part of this paper several measures (indices) of central bank 
independence are used. According to these indices, central banks in which the only 
or main objective of monetary policy (as specified in the central bank law) is price 
stability  are classified as being more independent than central bank laws with a 
number of objectives in addition to price stability,  or central banks in whose law 
price stability is not mentioned as an objective at all. 
Therefore, following most of the literature we proxy CBI as the strength of the 
'conservative bias'  of the central bank as embodied in the law l 
2.3.  Implications of the credibility vs. flexibility model 
The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibrium under central bank 
independence (Eq.  (3)) is  standard.  The resulting output and inflation rates  are 
given by 
(1 -/3)(1 + e) 
v,"  (4) 
Y'=  (1-/3)2(1+E)+X 
X  X 
k  -  (5) 
~r,=  (1-/3)(1+,)  (1-/3)2(1 +,)  +X 
From Eqs.  (4) and (5) we can easily derive the expressions for the variance of 
output and inflation 
(1 -/3)(1 + E)  trf  (6) 
Vat(y) =  (1 ~  ~)-~--~  +--~  ~ +  X 
X  (7) 
Var(qr)=  (1-/3)2(1+,)+X 
Following  Cukierrnan  (1992,  pp.  353-355)  in  this  section  we  investigate the 
1 Eijffinger and Hoebefichts  (1996)  explicitly  distinguish between  conservativeness  arid  indepen- 
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effects of CBI on the implied distributions of output and inflation. As is suggested 
by the main intuition of the Rogoff model (see  Eqs.  (6)  and (7)),  there  is  an 
inverse  relation between CBI (~) and the mean and variance of the inflation rate 
and  a  positive  relation between CBI and the variance of output. The reason is 
simple,  increasing the  central  bank's  commitment to  fighting inflation reduces 
society's credibility problem (and hence the mean and variance of inflation) at the 
expense of a  distorted response to output shocks,  i.e.  flexibility,  increasing the 
variance of ouput. Finally, the mean output level is unaffected by CBI, as is to be 
expected in a natural rate model 2. We now move on to confront the implications 
of the credibility vs. flexibility model with some empirical evidence. 
3. Empirical evidence on central bank independence 
This section takes a hard look into the empirical evidence regarding the link 
between central bank independence and the level and variability of inflation and 
economic growth, respectively. Unfortunately, most existing research has focused 
on one measure of central bank independence only, so that it is not clear whether 
conclusions drawn are 'measure specific'. To overcome this difficulty, we use the 
measures of Alesina (1988,  1989),  Grilli et al.  (1991),  Eijfflnger and Schaling 
(1993a,  1995)  and Cukierman (1992)  as explanatory variables. We compare the 
outcomes  of  our  empirical  analysis  on  the  relationship  between  central  bank 
independence and the level and variability of inflation and economic growth with 
results reported in the literature. 
3.1.  The level of inflation 
According to Alesina (1988,  1989),  countries with an independent central bank 
will have lower rates of inflation than do countries with a dependent central bank. 
This well-known inverse relationship between central bank independence and the 
level of inflation is also supported by empirical studies of De Haan and Sturm 
(1992),  Alesina  and  Summers  (1993)  and  Eijffinger and  Schaling  (1993b).  It 
should,  however,  be  noted  that  a  negative  correlation  between  central  bank 
independence and inflation does not necessarily imply causation. The correlation 
between both variables could be explained by a third factor, e.g. the culture and 
tradition of monetary stability in a country, explaining both an independent central 
bank and low inflation 3. 
2 Formally this can be shown by taking the fast derivative of both moments of output and inflation 
with respect to  ~. 
3 The standard example is the case of Germany, where the hyperinflation in the  1920s led to  a 
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Still,  the degree of central bank independence may be  an important factor in 
explaining the level of inflation, because central bank independence reflects the 
ability and  willingness  to  conduct  an  autonomous  monetary policy directed  at 
price stability. If not seriously hampered by wage increases, budget deficits and 
government debt, such policy will eventually lead to a low and sustainable level of 
inflation. The ultimate determinants of central bank independence are discussed 
more extensively in Eijffinger and De Haan (1996). 
Using OLS regressions we investigate the link between the average level of 
inflation (annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index) and the degree 
of central bank independence according to the measures of Alesina (AL), Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT), Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) and Cukierman 
(LVAU).  The  countries  considered  are  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  The relationship between average inflation in these countries 
and the four indices of central bank independence is analyzed for the post-Bret- 
ton-Woods period  1972-1992.  Under the  Bretton-Woods  system of fixed ex- 
change rates, countries were committed to an exchange rate target and had little 
room to conduct an autonomous domestic monetary policy. Thus, the relationship 
between  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  is  likely  to  be  much  less 
straightforward before  1972.  Regression analysis by De Haan and Sturm (1992) 
supports this view. These authors found no significant relationship between both 
variables for the period 1961-1969. 
In our analysis the post-Bretton-Woods period is divided into two subperiods 
(1972-1982  and  1983-1992)  in  order  to  distinguish  between  EMS  countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and, partly, 
Austria, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) on the one hand and non-EMS 
countries  (Australia,  Canada,  Finland,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Sweden, 
Switzerland  and  the  United  States)  on  the  other.  Although the  exchange  rate 
mechanism  of the  EMS  (ERM)  was  enacted  in  March  1979  after  the  'snake 
arrangement', Ungerer (1990) characterizes the first phase of the EMS (1979-1982) 
as a period of 'initial orientation' full of frequent and, sometimes, large realign- 
ments of central rates.  From  1982  onwards, the EMS enters a  second phase of 
'consolidation' (1982-1987),  and, after the accord of Basle-Nyborg, moves into a 
third  phase  of  're-examination'  (1987-present)4.  Consequently,  the  negative 
correlation between central bank independence and inflation is expected to be less 
clear cut during the second subperiod (1983-1992) than during the first subperiod 
(1972-1982),  because of the priority EMS countries gave at that time to exchange 
4 According  to Ungerer (1990, p. 338) the phase of consolidation  was marked  by "...a widespread 
consensus to follow  stability-oriented  policies, an increasing  convergence  in the development  of costs, 
prices and monetary  aggregates, and by long periods without  realignments  of central rates." S. Eifffinger et al. /  European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998) 73-88  79 
rate stability. After  1982  monetary policy in these countries, except Germany as 
the  anchor country, has become increasingly endogenous because exchange rate 
targets became dominant. 
Table  1  shows  our  estimation  results  for  average  inflation  and  the  four 
measures of central bank independence during the whole period (1972-1992)  and 
both subperiods (1972-1982  and  1983-1992).  Following Romer (1993)  we have 
also  included  the  variable  'openness'  as  measured  by  the  percentage  share  of 
imports in GDP in the regression equation as an explanatory variable for the level 
of  inflation.  During  the  post-Bretton-Woods  period  and  both  subperiods,  the 
inverse relationship between inflation and central bank independence appears to be 
significant for all measures.  It should  also be noted  that  including  the  variable 
openness  doesn't change  the  results  much,  indicating  that  the  estimated  coeffi- 
cients are robust. 
The conclusion that follows from Table 1 is that the more independent a central 
bank is,  the  lower the  rate  of inflation  in  the  long  run  will  be.  The  table  also 
confu'ms our intuition that the inflation reducing effect of a one unit increase in an 
index of CBI is larger in the first subperiod than in the second. This holds for all 
four indices of CBI. 
Cukierman has elaborated his legal independence index (LVAU) for 68 coun- 
tries,  i.e.  21  developed industrial  countries and 47  developing countries.  Cukier- 
man found no significant link between central bank independence and inflation for 
the group of developing countries. In his opinion, this is a consequence of the fact 
that these countries have 'less regard for the law'  s 
Because the four indices of CBI that we used in our analysis all are defined on 
a different scale, the size of the parameters is difficult to interpret. Therefore, we 
also calculated the elasticities of inflation with respect to the different measures of 
CBI. We did this by estimating a regression equation in which the log of inflation 
is explained by the log of CBI and a constant. The results are presented in Table 2. 
From Table 2  we conclude that for the whole  sample period and for the first 
subperiod a one percent increase in CBI as measured by the GMT index yields the 
highest reduction in the rate of inflation. For the second subperiod, the elasticity of 
inflation with respect to the Alesina index is the highest. Interestingly, a compari- 
son between the first and the  second subperiod doesn't give a  clearcut result in 
Table  2,  as  it  did  in  Table  1.  The  elasticity  of  inflation  with  respect  to  CBI 
((O~r/OCBI) • (CBI/zr)) is more or less constant over the subperiods, whereas the 
marginal effects of CBI on inflation are lower in the second subperiod. The reason 
for  this  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  inflation  in  the  second  subperiod  (on 
average,  for  the  whole  sample  4.8%)  was  much  lower  than  in  the  first  one 
5 This is only valid for the legal measure of Cukierman for central bank independence. If the 
'turnover rate' of central bank governors is used as a measure of actual independence, Cukierman 
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Table 2 
Elasticity of inflation with respect to the measures of CBI 
81 
Explanatory variables  1972-1992  1972-1982  1983-1992 
Constant  2.44 (25.58)  2.70 (28.34)  2.04 (12.80) 
Alesina (AL)  -  0.68 ( -  5.67)* "  -  0.63 ( -  5.29)" "  -  0.82 ( -  4.08)" * 
R 2 (adjusted)  0.66  0.63  0.49 
Constant  3.54 (11.83)  3.73 (13.11)  2.66 (6.02) 
Grilli et al. (GMT)  -0.78  (-  5.26)*  "  -0.73  (-5.15)  ° *  -0.62  (-2.85)' 
R 2 (adjusted)  0.62  0.61  0.31 
Constant  2.42 (15.35)  2.66 (18.17)  1.98 (11.02) 
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES)  -  0.48 ( -  3.06)* "  -  0.44 ( -  2.99) *'  -  0.57 ( -  3.17)" * 
R 2 (adjusted)  0.32  0.31  0.34 
Constant  1.54 (8.11)  1.84 (9.95)  1.07 (4.00) 
Cukierman (LVAU)  -  0.38 ( -  2.42) °  -  0.38 ( -  2.51)*  -  0.35 ( -  1.58) 
R 2 (adjusted)  0.21  0.23  0.08 
t-values are  in parentheses.  One  asterisk indicates that the  coefficient is significantly different from 
zero  at  a  95%  confidence level,  two  asterisks indicate that  the  coefficient  is  significant at  a  99% 
confidence level. 
(10.7%).  The decline for the low CBI, high inflation  countries was larger than for 
the high CBI, low inflation  countries which explains the lower marginal effect in 
the second subperiod. Inflation has decreased substantially and CBI hasn't changed. 
So the factor (CBI/Ir) makes that the elasticity  is constant over the subperiods. 
Finally, it is interesting  to note that Debelle and Fischer (1995) have shown that 
if the GMT measure is split into various components (lack of goal independence, 
political independence  and economic independence) the two variables most closely 
tied to inflation  performance are lack of goal independence (i.e.  the bank has a 
statutory  requirement  to pursue price stability)  and economic independence (i.e. 
instrument  independence);  the variables relating to appointment procedures are not 
significantly  related to inflation. 
3.2. The variability of inflation 
What is the empirical  relationship  between central  bank independence and the 
variability of inflation? Chowdhury (1991) has investigated the relation between 
the level and variability of inflation in 66 countries for the period from  1955 to 
1985. He concludes  that  during  this  period  there  exists  a  significant,  positive 
correlation  between both variables.  De Haan and Sturm (1992) have also examined 
this relation  in eighteen industrial  countries for the period 1961-1987. They found 
Note to Table  1: 
t-values are  in parentheses.  One  asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 
zero  at  a  95%  confidence  level,  two  asterisks indicate that  the  coefficient is  significant at  a  99% 
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Table 3 
Variance of inflation  and the measures of CBI 
Explanatory variables  1972-1992  1972-1982  1983-1992 
Constant  25.34 (4.61)  11.85 (2.23)  12.02 (4.06) 
Alesina  (AL)  - 4.61 ( - 2.02)  - 0.72 (- 0.31)  -  3.31 (- 2.59) * 
R2 (adjusted)  0.16  - 0.06  0.26 
Constant  45.51 (8.15)  30.93 (5.77)  25.25 (4.28) 
Grilli  et al. (GMT)  -  3.40 ( -  5.09)* *  - 2.35 ( - 3.41)* *  -  2.31 ( - 3.27) * * 
R  2 (adjusted)  0.61  0.40  0.38 
Constant  26.38 (4.13)  17.70 (2.99)  11.59 (1.93) 
Eijffmger-Schaling  (ES)  -3.63 (- 1.66)  - 2.31 (- 1.15)  -  1.79 (-0.87) 
R  2 (adjusted)  0.09  0.02  - 0.01 
Constant  27.04 (5.09)  18.60 (4.59)  8.60 (3.08) 
Cukierman  (LVAU)  -  30.41 ( - 2.24)*  - 23.10 ( - 2.24)*  -  10.60 ( -  1.49) 
R  2 (adjusted)  0.18  0.18  0.06 
t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 
zero at a 95% confidence level, two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at a 99% 
confidence level. 
a  clear,  positive correlation between both variables for the  post-Bretton-Woods 
subperiods 1970-1978 and 1979-1987, but no for the subperiod 1961-1969. 
We expect that greater independence should lead to less variability of inflation. 
We assume the various measures of central bank independence (AL, GMT, ES and 
LVAU) to be the explanatory variables of the variance of inflation (CPI) for the 
sample.  Again,  the  relationship between  the  four  indices  and  the  variance  of 
inflation is examined for the complete post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1992) 
and our two subperiods (1972-1982 and  1983-1992).  During the second subpe- 
riod,  the  negative correlation between  central bank independence and  inflation 
variability is also expected to be less clear cut than during the first subperiod as a 
consequence of growing exchange rate stability between EMS countries. 
Table 3 shows the results for the variance of inflation and the four measures of 
central bank independence using data from the  sample. The inverse relationship 
between inflation variability and independence is significant for the index of Grilli 
et al. (all periods), for the Cukierman index (whole period and first subperiod) and 
for the Alesina index (second subperiod). For the other indices and periods,  we 
find a  negative but insignificant relation for both the  whole period,  and its  two 
subperiods. From this table, it may be concluded that there is some evidence that 
greater independence of a central bank guarantees a more stable inflation 6. Hence 
6 De Haan and Sturm (1992) find a significant negative relationship  for the modified measure of 
Cwilli et al. and for the Alesina and ES indices during the period 1961-1987. Alesina and Summers 
(1993) report similar results for an average of the Alesina and GMT index. S. Eifffinger  et al. / European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998) 73-88 
Table 4 
CBI and the association between mean and variance of inflation 
83 
Index  1972-1992  1972-1982  1983-1992 
AL  0.24  0.06  0.50 
GMT  0.86  0.89  1.02 
ES  0.25  0.23  0.30 
LVAU  0.21  0.26  0.19 
The figures in the table represent the fraction of the covariance between the mean and the variance of 
inflation that is due to their common association with the index of CBI for the different periods. 
there is  some empirical evidence that the more independent the central bank,  the 
lower the variance of the inflation rate. 
We have  also calculated,  for each  measure  of CBI,  how much  of the  strong 
positive association between the mean and the variance of inflation is due to their 
common  association  with  CBI.  This  analysis  is  performed  along  the  lines  of 
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1995).  We predicted the mean and 
the  variance  of inflation,  using  only  CBI  as  an  explanatory  variable.  The  ratio 
between  the covariance of the predictions  and the covariance of the  actual mean 
and  variance  of  inflation  are  a  measure  for  the  extent  to  which  the  positive 
association  between  variance  and  mean  can  be  attributed  to  CBI.  We  find  the 
following ratios  as  presented  in Table  4  7.  Cukierman  (1992)  reports  a  value  of 
0.19  for developed countries for the period  1950-1989.  This comes close to our 
value of 0.21 for the LVAU index for our sample period. The most striking result 
that we find in Table 4  is  that between  86  and  100%  of the positive  covariance 
between the mean and the variance of inflation can be explained by cross country 
variations of the GMT index. 
3.3.  Economic growth 
Central  bank independence  may stimulate  economic growth in the  longer run 
because  with  a  low  and  stable  rate  of  inflation  the  functioning  of  the  price 
mechanism will be better. Empirical research by Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) 
shows  that  inflation  reduces  economic growth s.  This  may be  explained  by the 
positive correlation between the level and variability of inflation. Greater variation 
in the rate of inflation can imply increasing uncertainty  about inflation and may, 
thereby,  lead  to  lower  economic  growth.  This  relationship  between  inflation 
variability and economic growth is, however, not supported by most studies. 
7 The fact that for the GMT index the ratio is larger than one must be due to negative correlation 
between the residuals of the two regressions. 
s This conclusion  of Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) is contradicted in a study by Karras (1993). 84  s. Eifffinger et al. /  European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998) 73-88 
Various  studies  have  examined  directly  whether  central  bank  independence 
affects  economic  growth.  Grilli  et  al.  (1991),  De  Haan  and  Sturm  (1992), 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b) and Alesina and Summers (1993) all conclude that 
central bank independence has no effect on economic growth. 
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  results  reported  in  Table  5  which  presents 
estimates  for the  average  annual  growth  rate  of per  capita real  Gross  Domestic 
Product,  and  the  four measures  of central  bank  independence.  The  literature on 
long-run economic growth identifies various factors that determine the growth rate 
of a  country. Based on Barro (1991),  De Long and Summers  (1992)  and Levine 
and Renelt (1992)  we have chosen two additional variables to be included in the 
regression:  Initial  GDP  per  capita  (Y60)  and  the  share  of  investment  in  GDP 
(I/Y). The relationship between real economic growth and central bank indepen- 
dence  appears  to  be  insignificant except for  the  GMT  index  during  the  second 
subperiod (1983-1992)  where central bank independence has a  positive effect on 
growth.  The coefficients for the other indices and  periods have  mixed signs and 
are insignificant. In general, empirical evidence shows that there is no relationship 
Table 5 
Average economic growth and the measures of CBI 
Explanatory variables  1972-1992  1972-1982  1983-1992 
Constant  3.50 (3.64)  1.73 (1.26)  4.44 (3.80) 
Alesina (AL)  0.20 (1.52)  0.04 (0.20)  0.38 (2.03) 
I/Y  -0.00 (-0.00)  0.06 (1.65)  -0.05 (- 1.24) 
Y60  -0.31 (-4.62)* *  -0.25 (-2.49)*  -0.33 (-3.81)* * 
R  E (adjusted)  0.62  0.52  0.43 
Constant  3.89 (5.85)  3.19 (2.78)  4.40 (6.18) 
Grilli et al. (GMT)  0.07 (2.06)  0.04 (0.75)  0.11 (2.24)' 
I/Y  -0.01 (-0.34)  0.01 (0.34)  -0.03 (-0.95) 
Yr0  -0.37 (-7.42)* *  -0.32 (-3.99)* *  -0.41 (-6.27)** 
R 2 (adjusted)  0.81  0.62  0.72 
Constant  3.61 (4.49)  1.81 (1.69)  4.70 (4.67) 
Eij  ffinger-Schaling (ES)  - 0.03 (- 0.33)  - 0.11 (- 0.97)  0.04 (0.32) 
I/V  0.01 (0.42)  0.07 (2.19)*  - 0.03 ( -  0.95) 
V60  -0.29 (-5.41)* *  -0.23 (-3.14)* *  -0.32 (-4.13)* * 
R E (adjusted)  0.66  0.59  0.46 
Constant  3.45 (3.82)  1.95 (1.58)  4.26 (3.95) 
Cukierman (LVAU)  0.26 (0.36)  - 0.47 ( -  0.51  )  1.17 ( I. 17) 
I/Y  0.01 (0.47)  0.06 (1.85)  -0.02 (- 0.70) 
Y60  -0.30 (-4.65)* *  -0.24 (- 2.70)*  -0.33 (-3.86)* * 
R  2 (adjusted)  0.62  0.57  0.41 
t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 
zero at a 95%  confidence level, two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at a 99% 
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Table 6 
Variance of economic growth and the measures  of CBI 
85 
Explanatory variables  1972-1992  1972-1982  1983-1992 
Constant  7.95 (3.59)  7.96 (4.06)  7.33 (2.25) 
Alesina (AL)  -0.65 (-0.68)  -0.14 (-0.17)  -  1.11 (-0.79) 
R 2 (adjusted)  -  0.03  -  0.06  -  0.03 
Constant  11.63 (4.36)  12.31 (5.12)  10.48 (2.98) 
Grilli et al. (GMT)  -  0.60 ( -  1.88)  -  0.50 ( -  1.74)  -  0.69 ( -  1.63) 
R 2 (adjusted)  0.14  0.11  0.09 
Constant  9.06 (3.32)  8.40 (3.73)  9.30 (2.55) 
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES)  -0.71 (-0.77)  -0.10 (-0.14)  -  1.34 (- 1.08) 
R 2 (adjusted)  -  0.02  -  0.06  0.01 
Constant  6.97 (3.69)  6.64 (4.01)  6.75 (2.39) 
Cukierman (LVAU)  -  1.51 (-0.31)  2.11 (0.50)  -4.84 (-0.67) 
R 2 (adjusted)  -  0.05  -  0.04  -  0.03 
t-values  are in parentheses. One asterisk  indicates  that  the coefficient is significantly  different  from 
zero  at  a  95%  confidence level, two asterisks  indicate  that  the coefficient is  significant  at  a  99% 
confidence level. 
between  central  bank  independence  and  average  real  output  growth 9.  We  also 
note that  a  one unit  increase  in  an  index  for CBI  leads  to  more  expected output 
growth in the second subperiod  than in the first one. 
3.4.  The variability of output growth 
Another  question  is  whether  there  exists  a  relationship  between  central  bank 
independence  and  the  variation  of economic  growth.  Theory  predicts  different 
outcomes.  According  to  Rogoff  (1985),  independent  central  banks  purchase  a 
lower level of inflation at the price of a  higher variability of real economic growth. 
In contrast,  Alesina and  Summers  (1993)  argue  that  an  autonomous  central  bank 
will be less inclined to conduct a  'stop-go'  policy which may limit fluctuations in 
economic growth.  Alesina and Gatti (1995)  formalize this point. 
Table  6  shows  results  of our  regression  analysis  where  the  four  measures  of 
central bank independence  try to explain the variance of annual  economic growth 
rates.  For  none  of the  four  measures,  the  coefficient appears  to  be  significantly 
different from zero. On top of that,  we also find most coefficients to be negative, 
indicating  that  more central  bank  independence  is  associated  with lower variance 
9 Cukierman (1993, p. 284) reports that when similar experiments  are repeated for LDCs, again, no 
association  is found between  legal independence  and growth.  Using several behavioral  measures  of 
central bank independence, like the turnover rate of central  bank governors,  and controlling for other 
determinants  of growth  Cukierman  et al.  (1993)  find a  ceteris  paribus  positive association  between 
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of output growth. Consequently, we may conclude that a higher degree of central 
bank  independence  is  not  associated  with  greater  variation  of real  economic 
growth rates. Alesina and Gatti (1995)  provide a possible theoretical explanation 
for this empirical finding. They suggest that variance of output growth consists of 
two components. Apart from productivity shocks that are also present in Rogoff 
(1985),  Alesina and Gatti (1995) have politically induced output shocks in their 
model. They show that the effect of these shocks can be reduced by making the 
central  bank  more  independent.  So  there  are  two  opposite  effects,  which  may 
explain these empirical findings. Comparing the two subperiods shows us that an 
increase in  CBI leads  to  a  larger expected reduction of the  variance  of output 
growth in the second subperiod than in the first one. 
4. Conclusion 
The main conclusions of this theoretical and empirical analysis of central bank 
independence with respect to the level and variability of inflation and economic 
growth are the following. 
First of all,  both our model and estimation results give further support to the 
well-known inverse relationship between the degree of central bank independence 
and the level of inflation found by Alesina (1988,  1989)  and Cukierman et al. 
(1992).  Secondly, we find some empirical evidence, especially for the Cukierman 
and GMT indices, supporting our proposition that the more independent the central 
bank is, the lower the variability of inflation. 
Thirdly, according to our proposition that the level of economic growth does 
not  depend  on  the  prevailing  monetary  regime,  no  relationship  can  be  found 
between central bank independence and the level of real output growth in the long 
run. Our interpretation of this outcome is that the attainment and maintenance of 
low inflation by an independent central bank is not accompanied by large costs or 
benefits  in  terms  of  sustainable  economic  growth.  Fourthly  and  finally,  our 
estimation results  reject  clearly  the  proposition  of a  positive  relation  between 
independence and the variability of real  output growth. An independent central 
bank does not lead to more variable economic growth in the short run. In other 
words, inflation-averse central banks do not bear the costs of triggering recessions 
nor do politically sensitive central banks reap the benefits of avoiding recessions. 
The absence of a long-run trade off between CBI and the mean and variance of 
economic growth implies that the establishment of central bank independence in 
countries, which did not use to have this, is a  'free lunch"  (Grilli et al.,  1991). 
When looking at the differences between the subperiods  that we distinguish, 
there are three observations with respect to the point estimates of CBI that can be 
made for all four indices. First, the inflation reducing effect of a one unit increase 
of CBI,  according to  all  indices,  was  larger in  the  first  subperiod than in  the 
second.  Interestingly, this  doesn't hold  in  terms  of elasticities.  Secondly,  after 
controlling for initial GDP and the share of investment, a one unit increase of CBI S. Eijffinger et al. /  European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998)  73-88  87 
leads to more output growth in the second subperiod than in the first. Thirdly, a 
one unit  increase of CBI  leads  to  a  larger reduction of the  variance  of output 
growth in the second subperiod than in the first. 
5. The data 
-  The mean and variance  of inflation have been calculated from Consumer 
Prices- All Items, Non-adjusted, OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
-  The mean and variance of per capita output growth, initial (1960) per capita 
real GDP and the share of investment over GDP are calculated from Penn World 
Tables. 
-  Openness as measured by the share of imports in GDP is calculated from the 
National  Accounts  of  OECD  Countries,  1960-1977,  1977-1989,  1978-1992. 
(Imports of goods and services/GDP), in current prices. OECD Paris, 1979, 1991, 
1994. 
-  The indices for CBI can be found in Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).  Some 
observations are not available for the  sample of 20 countries.  For AL,  Austria, 
Ireland and Portugal are not available, for GMT, Finland, Norway and Sweden, for 
ES, Ireland and for LVAU Portugal are lacking. 
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